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Institute on Problems of the Average-Sized Estate

FOREWORD
On May 16 and 23, 1950, the Denver Bar Association sponsored a legal institute devoted to the everyday problems of handling an average-sized estate.
The institute was prepared under the direction of Co-chairman Charles H.
Haines, Jr., and Wayne D. Williams. The speakers were Hubert D. Henry,
Merrill A. Knight, Barkley L. Clanahan and John L. Griffith. A summary of
their remarks is presented here, together with a short comment by the learned
moderator, the Hon. C. Edgar Kettering of the Denver County Court.
Mr. Henry began the institute on May 16 with a discussion of will-drafting.
He took as his client, the hypothetical Mr. Abe Gottrocks, an old friend of his
Westminster Law School classes. In this instance, Mr. Gottrocks had a wife
and three minor children, and an estate valued at approximately $30,000, including the family home.
In preparing Mr. Gottrocks' will, Counselor Henry used a check list that
he feels will cover most of the cases which come into a lawyer's office. From
the many available model wills, Mr. Henry has drawn the simple provisions
which, in his judgment, will meet the needs of the client with the average-sized
estate, this time, Mr. Gottnotsomanyrocks. Mr. Henry called attention to another familiar model will for use in the disposition of larger and more complicated estates, that of John Isekore which appeared in the August, 1947 issue
of DICTA (24 Dicta 168).

CHECK LIST AND MODEL WILL FOR
AVERAGE-SIZED ESTATES
HUBERT D. HENRY
of the Denver Bar

1. Wills have their own peculiar form, different from living trust
agreements and other instruments.
2. The testator and all beneficiaries should be named accurately,
and all property given accurately named or clearly described.
3. If testator does not wish legacies charged with inheritance
taxes, this must be provided in will.
4. It is often desirable that the real property used as a home,
the household goods and personal effects be given outright
and specifically, rather than left in trust.
5. Be sure that all of testator's property is given. Does testator
have a power of appointment to be exercised?
6. Are after born children provided for or clearly excluded?
7. Is testator under any contract or agreement to make a will?
8. Are there alternative provisions in case of widow's election?
9. Does the testator contemplate marriage? Will is revoked by
marriage unless it otherwise expressly provides.
10. Be sure that testator has provided funds for the payment of
estate and inheritance taxes, debts and expenses of administration. Be sure that he has not given away more than his
net estate after payment of these items.
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Trust provisions.
a. Are the provisions for disposition of income and principal
such that the will will carry out adequately the testator's
wishes, even in face of a radical change in conditions after
his death?
b. Are the remainders clearly tied up?
c.. Is the rule against perpetuities violated?
d. Does the trustee have adequate powers of sale, investment,
management, allocation, voting stock, participation in reorganizations, etc.?
e. Should the testamentary trust be removed from the jurisdiction of the probate court?
f. If not, may the trustee exercise his powers without order
of court?
g. If under court jurisdiction, is surety bond waived?
h. If more than one trustee, what powers may be exercised
by less than all trustees?
i. Provisions for successor trusteeship.
j. If termination of trust depends on age of any person, state
that person's birth date in will.
Give to executor same powers given to trustee.
Give executor's powers to office, so they may pass to successor.
Make provisions for alternative executor.
Is executor relieved from furnishing surety on bond?
Be sure that will is properly executed, and that no person
named in Will as beneficiary or fiduciary is a witness.
There must be at least two witnesses. Have a full and complete attestation clause.
Advise testator to put will in a safe place. Wills may be deposited with county court. If bank is named executor, will
may be deposited with bank. A safe deposit box may be used.
Don't keep it yourself if you can avoid it-too much responsibility.
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ABE GOTTROCKS

I, Abe Gottrocks, of Denver, Colorado, make, publish and
declare this to be my Last Will and Testament, revoking all wills,
testaments and codicils heretofore made by me.
I.
I direct my executor to pay my lawful debts, funeral expenses
and expenses of my last illness. I direct my executor to pay all
inheritance, estate, legacy, succession and other death taxes, payable in respect of my estate or of any devise, legacy or distribution under this will, or levied by reason of my death, whether or
not the property, transfer, or proceeds with respect to which the
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said taxes are levied are a part of my estate at my death, such
taxes to be paid by my executor as an expense of administration
and without reimbursement to my estate by or deduction from
the share of any beneficiary, legatee, devisee or transferee.
II.
to
my
beloved wife, Betty Gottrocks,
I devise and bequeath
all and every part of my estate, of whatever kind and wherever
situated, except as above provided in paragraph I; provided,
however, if my wife shall not survive me, or, if surviving me does
not live until complete distribution of my estate, every part of
my estate not distributed to my wife during her lifetime shall be
distributed as provided in paragraph III hereof.
III.
I devise and bequeath every part of my estate, of whatever
kind and wherever situated, not paid or distributed under paragraph I or II, to my trustee hereinafter named, in trust upon the
following trust:
1. The trustee shall pay, from the income or principal of the
trust such amounts as it in its sole and uncontrolled discretion
deems advisable for the care, support, maintenance and education
of my children, Harold, born January 17, 1934, Heddie, born
April 19, 1938, and Frank, born August 12, 1942, and such other
children as may be born to me after the execution of this will.
Such payments may be made by my trustee directly to my said
children, or to any person, association, corporation or institution
having any charge or expense for the care, support, maintenance
and education of any of my said children. In making said payments my trustee shall not be required to equalize payments among
my said children but shall pay such amounts, at such times, and
for such child as it in its discretion deems advisable, having in
mind the age of my said children, their ability to support themselves, the amount of the trust fund and the time during which
it may be necessary for the trust to be used for these purposes.
After all of my children have attained the age of 21 years my
trustee shall distribute the balance then remaining in its hands
to my children equally.
2. In the event of the death of all my children prior to final
distribution of the trust, I direct my trustee, upon the death of
the last survivor of my said children, to distribute the balance of
the trust then remaining in its hands to the persons who would
be my heirs at law had I died at the time of said distribution.
IV.
I appoint the Security Bank of Denver, Colorado, executor
and trustee of this will and direct that my said executor or trustee
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be allowed to serve without giving surety on its bond in either
capacity.
V.
My executor and trustee, in each capacity, shall have full and
unrestricted discretionary authority to take, collect, sue for, compromise, adjust, hold, manage, control, improve, sell, assign, transfer, convey, deliver, contract with respect to, or otherwise deal
with, without application to or order of court, any property, real
or personal, constituting a part of my estate or trust estate, without any duty upon any person dealing with it to see to the application of any money or other property delivered to it; to make
allocations or distributions to beneficiaries in cash or in kind, or
partly in cash and partly in kind, at the market value at date of
distribution as determined by it; to hold any property which I
may own at the time of my death for such time as it deems wise,
even though such property is not of a kind usually selected by
trustees as a trust investment, and even though such retention
may result in inadequate diversification; to invest and reinvest all
or part of the principal of the estate or trust estate in real or
personal property or interests therein, such as common trust funds,
without limiting such investments to the classes of property which
are now or may hereafter be prescribed by law for the investment
of trust funds; to pay, compromise or adjust any claim or liability; and generally to have such powers with regard to the
assets of the estate or trust estate as an individual has with respect
to his own property. .
VI.
Upon the death of my wife I direct that my sister, Joan
Smith, shall be the guardian of the persons of my minor children
and shall have exclusive custody of them.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I sign my name at Denver, Colorado, this 10th day of May, 1950, in the presence of the witnesses
signing as such, who, at my request, in my presence, and in the
presence of each other, sign as attesting witnesses hereto.
ABE GOTTROCKS.
The foregoing instrument was signed, published and declared
by Abe Gottrocks, while of sound mind and memory and under
no constraint, as and for his Last Will and Testament, in our
presence, and we, in his presence, at his request, and in the presence of each other, subscribe our names as attesting witnesses
the day and year above written.
JOHN DOUGH, Denver, Colo.
HAVA HART, Denver, Colo.

August, 1950

DICTA

SIMPLE DEVICES FOR THE TRANSFER OF
ASSETS WITHOUT ADMINISTRATION
MERRILL A. KNIGHT
of the Denver Bar

The transfer of property from a decedent is usually accompanied by a formal administration proceeding in the county court.
The fact that during last year 4,260 Denver residents died and
approximately 2,100 estate proceedings were instituted in the
county court would indicate that about only half of these decedents
had property warranting administration proceedings. The additional fact, however, that during the same period approximately
4,000 inheritance tax applications were filed from Denver leads
to a conclusion that practically every decedent possessed assets
subject to inheritance tax, irrespective of estate proceedings.
This article deals with the means or devices by which assets
are thus transferred without formal administration. The device
or means of transfer will be found to vary with the type of property involved. There is no comprehensive law or regulation;
rather, real property and many forms of personal property are
affected by specific laws or regulations.
GOVERNMENT BONDS

Consider first United States Government bonds. At this time
there are approximately $60,000,000,000 invested in government
bonds, and some ten million investors have payroll or checking
account deduction plans. We are considering in this regard only
government bonds known as United States Savings Bonds and
particularly the series "E", "F", and "G", which are the most
popular. These bonds may all be held by persons in their individual names, in the names of two individuals as co-owners, or
in the name of one individual payable on death to a designated
beneficiary. Series "F" and "G" bonds may, in addition, be issued
in the name of a corporation, partnership, or fiduciary, but all
co-owner or beneficiary bonds must be in the name of natural
persons only.
These bonds are authorized by the Second Liberty Bond Act,
and the issuance and transfer are governed by Treasury Department regulations, as now contained in Treasury Department Circular No. 530. The co-owner form of registration authorized by
the Treasury Department is "Mr. John Jones or Mrs. Mary Jones"
and, of course, either co-owner can redeem with or without the
consent or knowledge of the other co-owner. In the event of the
death of one co-oWner no evidence of any kind is required for
redemption of the bond by the other co-owner and the survivor
is the sole owner.
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In the Colorado case of In re Estate of Stanley,1 the decedent
and another were co-owners of government bonds, but decedent's
will contained a legacy bequeathing all bonds. In the controversy
between the legatee and the surviving co-owner, the court upheld
the ownership of the surviving co-owner as provided by the Treasury Department regulations.
Re-issuance in Lieu of Redemption
If the surviving co-owner, however, desires that the bond be
re-issued rather than redeemed, that request for re-issuance is
made on Treasury Department form PD 1787. The bond, the
completed form, and a death certificate of the deceased owner are
presented and the re-issuance is accomplished. Form PD 1787
merely requires the description of the bond, the designation of
the requested form of re-issuance, the signature by the surviving
owner, and the certification of that signature by a proper official.
This same form is used in connection with beneficiary bonds where
it is desired to omit a designated beneficiary, to omit a present
beneficiary and name another person as beneficiary or co-owner,
to change the present beneficiary to co-owner, and to add a coowner or beneficiary. It is to be noted that if a beneficiary is
designated on the surrendered bond and is living, he must execute
the consent to the change which is a part of the form, executing
the same before an authorized certifying officer. If the designated beneficiary is deceased, proof of his death must accompany
the request.
Now, fn the event of the death of a single owner or the death
of both co-owners, the procedure to be followed is determined
by the fact of whether or not there is an estate proceeding. If
there is such a proceeding, payment is requested by the personal
representative who must furnish a certified copy of letters and
a death certificate of the first co-owner, if a co-owner bond is
involved. If the letters were issued more than six months prior
to the request for redemption, they must be certified to be in full
force and effect. If the estate, however, is closed, then the person
found by the court to be entitled to the bond requests the redemption, furnishing a certified copy of the court order upon which
the ownership is based and a death certificate of the first deceased owner, if a co-owner bond. If re-issue rather than redemption is requested, then the representative of the estate prior to
distribution requests re-issue using form PD 1455; or the person entitled to the bonds as legatee by the court order requests
the re-issue, using the first designated form PD 1787. Form PD
1455 is to be used by the fiduciary for re-issue and is subject to
the restriction that the fiduciary may not request re-issue in
'In

re Estate of Stanley, 102 Colo. 422, 80 P. 2d 332 (1938).
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co-ownership or beneficiary form. If the person entitled thereto
desires a beneficiary or co-owner bond, the fiduciary must first
complete PD 1455, and the individual then completes PD 1787.
If there are two or more persons entitled to the bond, a separate
form must be used for each distributee. If desired, a single bond
may be divided in authorized denominations between two or more
distributees.
Transfer Where There Is No Administration
Turning now to a matter more pertinent to the subject, we
consider the transfer of bonds where there has been no administration. Where the owner or surviving owner died intestate
and the face amount of the bonds does not exceed $500, re-issue
or redemption may be requested on form PD 1946. If the debts
of the decedent and his estate have not been paid, the unpaid
creditors must join in the application. Payment will be made to
a creditor, but not re-issue. In the absence of unpaid creditors,
payment or re-issue will be made to the heirs of the decedent, and
the application must be signed by all who are listed as heirs. Where
the deceased bond owner left a will but it has not been admitted
to probate and no administration is intended, or if the face amount
of the bonds exceeds $500, then form PD 1646 is used. This form
includes a more detailed description of those persons normally
entitled to the estate of the decedent. It provides for the names,
addresses and ages of all who are or .might be heirs; the gross
value of the decedent's estate; names, addresses and amounts of
the bills of the undertaker, physician, nurses, hospitals, and other
persons rendering services or furnishing supplies in connection
with the last illness and burial of the decedent; a statement
whether the bills have been paid or not; a statement whether
there are other debts of the decedent; and finally, a request for
re-issuance or redemption. Ordinarily, such an application for
re-issue or redemption without administration will not be approved unless all debts of the decedent and of his estate have
been paid or provided for and receipts or receipted bills or creditors' consents furnished covering the expenses of last illness and
burial. By use of this form where redemption is sought, creditors will be paid from the proceeds of the bonds, and if unpaid
creditors are not so provided for in the application, written consent of the creditor to the requested redemption or re-issue must
be obtained and submitted with the form. In this connection, it
is to be noted that the heirs by use of this form may agree on a
re-issue or redemption among them not in accordance with the
laws of descent and distribution. The application must be signed
by all of the heirs. In the experience of the Federal Reserve Bank
in Denver, amounts up to $1600 in face value of bonds have been
either re-issued or redeemed through the use of this particular
form.
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Problems Where Minor Is Involved
Beneficiary bonds may be cashed by the beneficiary upon
proving his identity and providing a death certificate of the owner
with the bond. The minority of an owner or beneficiary of a bond
is not indicated on the face of the bond unless there is a legal
guardianship proceeding. If the legal guardianship proceeding
is noted on the bond, then it is dealt with by the legal representative, insofar as redemption is concerned, in the same manner as
if the legal representative were the owner. If the minority of
the owner is not noted on the bond, it is dealt with as any other
bond with the minor requesting re-issue or redemption just as
an adult, subject only to the condition that the certifying officer
believes that the minor knows what he is doing. If the certifying officer believes that the minor is not of sufficient age to have
the necessary judgment, payment of such bond may be requested
by the parent or other person with whom the minor resides upon
furnishing satisfactory proof of identity. Any re-issue involving
the bond of a minor will be restricted to such registration as
will adequately protect the minor's rights.
In dealing with government bonds, no inheritance tax release
is necessary.
POSTAL SAVINGS CERTIFICATES

Postal savings certificates constitute another popular medium
of investment as evidenced by the fact that there are 21,000 depositors in Denver who have on deposit $18,000,000. In connection
with postal savings certificates, it is to be remember that the
maximum amount that can be deposited by any one individual
is $2500, and certificates cannot be issued in co-ownership or
beneficiary form. The procedure for the issuance and cashing
of postal savings certificates is governed by postal laws and regulations under the direction of the Third Assistant Postmaster
General. Very few of these regulations are in printed form, and
merely come down by memorandum to the respective post offices.
In dealing with postal savings certificates belonging to a
deceased owner, if administration proceedings are had, whether
testate or intestate, the personal representative submits a certified copy of the letters to the post office and payment is made
to that representative. Here, if the appointment was more than
nine months prior to the request, the letters again must be certified to be in full force and effect.
In a situation where there is no administration of the decedent's estate and the deposit is reduced below $500 by paying
or reimbursing a person who has paid the expenses of last illness
and funeral of the decedent, then the heir or relative applies for
reimbursement and payment using forms PS 114 and PS 136.
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If the expenses of last illness and funeral are not paid prior to
the application, then the creditor may be paid directly by the
Post Office Department by using the two forms just mentioned,
plus forms PS 115 and PS l15A. Any balance then remaining
after the creditors' claims have been satisfied is paid to the heirs.
The Forms Necessary
PS 114 is the application form for payment. It requires a
full description of the applicant, the deceased, the amount on
deposit, the place of death of the deceased depositor, a statement
that no administration has been had upon the estate, and a description by name, age, address, and relationship of the persons
surviving the decedent who would be entitled by law to a distributive share in the estate. The accompanying form PS 136 is
a statement as to the expenses incurred in connection with the
last illness and funeral of the decedent, showing the name and
address of the creditor, together with the amount of the bill. If
those bills or any of them are not paid, then forms PS 115, which
is a statement by the creditor, and PS 115A, which is a verification of the creditor's statement, are filed with the other forms.
These forms, therefore, provide a method for distributing
the proceeds of postal savings certificates of a decedent by paying all expenses of last illness and funeral and remitting the balance to lawful heirs. If a distribution among the heirs is desired
which is otherwise than the normal laws of descent and distribution direct, then an additional form PS 134 must be signed by
all heirs designating the desired method of distribution. It is to
be noted in this connection that if the funds on deposit are not
ample to pay all creditors, then a pro-ration among the creditors
will be made by the Post Office Department.
If the deceased depositor left a widow and there has been
no administration of his estate, an amount up to $2500, the maximum deposit accepted, can be paid to the widow. This is true
even though the decedent died testate, if the Will has not been
probated, and no administration is intended. The widow applies
for such payment, again using form PS 114, and the same protection is afforded to creditors rendering services during -the
course of the last illness or funeral. Again, the creditors will be
paid directly, or if payment is not thus made, they must consent
to the payment of the widow.
Form PS 114 seems to be the basic form and it is merely
amended by striking inapplicable language and inserting pertinent information where a transfer or distribution it sought in
accordance with a court decree. In such case the form is executed
by the fiduciary and accompanied by a certified copy of the decree. The same form is used where the account is being trans-
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ferred under our small estates statute. In dealing with postal
savings deposits, no inheritance tax release or waiver is necessary or need accompany the application.
TRANSFER OF FAMILY AUTOMOBILE

Many attorneys have been confronted with the frustrating
problem of probating a will or administering an intestate estate
where the only asset was the family automobile. In 1949, the
title may
Colorado legislature provided a method whereby car
2
be transferred without administration proceedings.
In such case an application, being essentially an affidavit, is
filed with the Director of Revenue. In it are contained the facts
concerning the decedent, description of the car, statement of the
heirs at law of the decedent, statement that there were no unpaid
bills or claims against the decedent, that all expenses of funeral
and last illness have been paid, that there are no liens against
the car, and a request that the title be re-issued to the applicant
as the legal owner of the automobile. The present application
form is designed to be used where the widow applies for the
re-issuance, but it can be adapted to other situations by interlineation and amendment.
The application is accompanied by an indemnity bond protecting the Department of Revenue by reason of the requested
issuance. The bond is usually in an amount double the value of
the automobile, although the Director has in the past exercised
some discretion in this particular regard. If there are existing
liens against the car, the re-issuance is in such form as to protect the lien holder.
JOINT TENANCY, A LESS NOVEL DEVICE

Joint tenancy ownership of real property is such a wellknown, widely used and much discussed device for transferring
property without administration that no attempt will be made
to expand on it here. A bank account in the names of two or
more persons payable to them "or" any of them is deemed to
be owned in joint tenancy.3 . Securities may be similarly held, but
not here suffice. The statutory lannote that the word "or" will
4
guage should be followed.
The title to an automobile also may be in joint tenancy. The
authorization lies in a ruling of the Attorney-General rather than
in the statutes. If the title itself indicates an intention of the
owners to hold as joint tenants, the Director of Revenue will
recognize such intent and re-issue to the surviving owner. A
death certificate and inheritance tax release must accompany the
request for re-issue. Such intention would probably be clear
;COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 16, § 13 (12-15)
COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 18, § 45 (1935).
4CoLO. STAT. ANN., c. 92, § 17 (1935).

(Supp. 1949).
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where the words "joint tenants" or "jointly" were used. The
writer is not informed whether the words "and" or "or" inserted
between the owners' names would suffice. No doubt the AttorneyGeneral would rule in such a situation.
OTHER MORE HOMELY DEVICES FREQUENTLY BACKFIRE

There are many other devices used to transfer property without administration, some finding legal justification as in the use
of living trusts or conveyances with a reserved life estate. There
are still others such as joint safety boxes, envelopes containing
currency or property with a designated beneficiary's name on
the envelope, unrecorded deeds, and similar ingenious devices
which, more frequently than. not, result in litigation and a complete frustration of the original owner's desires.
Those that we have considered, however, constitute the principal devices now in use where property is transmitted from one
person to another without court proceedings. It is readily apparent that it is possible to transfer property of an almost unlimited
value by the use of several of. these devices. The family home,
automobile, bank account, securities, postal savings deposits, and
government bonds can all be held or owned in such a manner that
upon the death of one person beneficial ownership passes to another without estate proceedings. Those who are qualified may
draw conclusions or point a moral by reason of this fact. This
article does no more than summarily consider these simple devices.

TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS SHOULD REMAIN
UNDER COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION
HON. C. EDGAR KETTERING
Judge of the County Court, City and County of Denver

The purpose of this comment is to discourage the practice
in will-drafting of taking a testamentary trust out of the jurisdiction of the county court.' In nearly every case a testator who
does it, acts under the misapprehension that he thereby shows
his confidence in his trustee and eases his burden. He is doing
quite the opposite. Then, again, some will-drafters are confusing
this with the entirely justifiable practice of granting broad powers to the trustee-a subject with which it has no connection.
The effect is that every time the trustee needs or wants to
construe the will, or interpret his rights or duties under the
same, a need which may frequently occur, he must file a separate
suit in the district court. This of course is not as simple a procedure for him as to file a petition in the county court, if the trust
'COLO.

STAT.

ANN.,

C. 176, § 227(c)

(1935).
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estate is still pending there. Then again, the county court may
have the advantage of previous contact with the particular estate
and be familiar with the problems of the executor and trustee
with respect to it.
There are numerous problems arising in the administration
of a trust estate-often lasting over a period of many yearsconcerning which the trustee wants the advice or the formal orders
of some court of competent jurisdiction. In addition to the cases
of wills with trust provisions which are ambiguous and poorly
drawn, are those in which, although expertly drawn, conditions
have changed or unforeseen contingencies have arisen which require a court interpretation. Moreover, many situations arise in
which the trustee wants a court order not to clear an ambiguity,
but simply for his own protection-and this regardless of how
broad the powers may be. Thus, unlimited discretion may be given
as to amounts to be paid a beneficiary, yet the trustee may want
the protection of a court order before making substantial monthly
disbursements over a long period of time.
The only apparent advantages I can see in removing such
cases from the jurisdiction of the county court are that the trustee need not file annual reports, and there is a small docket fee.
The first of these is no real benefit to the trustee, because he has
to keep the records which make up the report in either case.
Furthermore, most trustees would prefer to file a report of their
acts in court for their own protection. As to the docket fee, it
is not large, being less than for decedents' estates.
It should be repeated that we are not discussing, nor attempting to discourage granting broad powers to trustees to act without
court order. The trustee can be given any degree of discretion,
relieved of giving bond, permitted to act without court order, etc.,
and still have the estate remain open as a trust estate under the
jurisdiction of the county court. The point is he must be subject
to the jurisdiction of some court, and I have tried to indicate some
of the reasons why it is more convenient that it be the county
court.
NICHOLAS HEADS SOUTHERN COLORADO BAR
The Southern Colorado Bar Association held its annual meeting on July 11 and elected the following officers for the ensuing
year: William B. Nicholas of Walsenburg, president; Ortus F.
Adams of Trinidad, vice-president; Gilbert Sanders of Trinidad,
secretary-treasurer; and Joseph F. Nigro of Trinidad, representative on the state Board of Governors.
THE BOOK TRADER'S CORNER
Chalkley A. Wilson, Foote Bldg., Sterling, has a set of Pacific
Reporters and U. S. Supreme Court Reports for sale.
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PRACTICAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS
IN AVERAGE-SIZED ESTATES
BARKLEY L. CLANAHAN
of the Denver Bar

The institute committee listed many topics which they deemed
desirable to have discussed in connection with the administration
of average-sized estates. I shall discuss as many of these topics
as I can simply with the hope of raising questions in your mind,
so that when you meet these problems you will recognize them.
In all estates, of course, the first problem of the attorney and
the fiduciary is to determine definitely what are the assets, where
they are located, and what is necessary for their protection. This
marshalling of assets immediately raises an important question:

Should a special administrator be appointed? The statute permits
such appointment during any contests over probation of the will
or the right of executorship (in case of either a testate or intestate estate), or indeed, whenever it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court to be in the best interests of the estate that someone be appointed pending issuance of letters to the regular personal representative.'
The county court thereupon may appoint any person or persons as special administrator to collect, take charge of, and preserve the estate of the decedent until probate of the will or until
administration of the estate is granted. This appointment may
be made without notice. The special administrator must qualify
as in the case of other personal representatives, and under the
order and direction of the court, he thereafter has all the powers,
duties, and liabilities of other administrators. It is also provided
in the statute that in all cases in which such an appointment is
made pending admission of a will to probate, it shall he the duty
of the court to appoint as such special administrator the executor
named in the will, unless it is made to appear that such appointment would be detrimental to the estate or prejudicial to the rights
of contestants.
I have discussed this matter with a number of banks, and
they state that they very rarely have a special administrator
appointed. Such institutional representatives generally can proceed under a will even though they haven't qualified, and people
will respect their authority. They feel that no responsibility or
liability will attach in connection with stocks and bonds, and that
as a practical matter, they can take over a house or business and
run it pending the outcome of a contest.
I COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 176 § 80 (1935).
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It is a different matter, however, when individual executors
are named under a will and the question of the advisability of
having someone appointed as special administrator arises. Right2
here it is well to review the powers of an executor before probate.
In general, the statute provides that the power of an executor
before probate and issuance of letters, unless a special administrator is appointed, extends only to the burial of the deceased,
the payment of the necessary funeral charges, and "the taking
care of the estate." If the will is rejected and the executor never
qualifies, the person who acted in this capacity is not liable as
an executor of his own wrong unless he refuses to deliver-up the
estate to the person authorized to receive it.
Thus, it is only after determining the nature of the assets
and considering the powers of an executor prior to probate that
one is able to make a proper decision regarding the necessity and
advisability of appointing a special administrator.
CONTINUATION OF DECEDENT'S BUSINESS

The will may contain powers to carry-on a business, in which
event the fiduciary will be able to do so without the necessity of
court order. If the will does not so provide, however, or if there
is no will, the problem is governed by statutory provision. 3 The
statute reads that "if it shall appear to the court that the decedent
was engaged in farming, the raising of livestock, or in any other
business, and that it is to the best interest of the estate that such
be continued for a reasonable time, to provide for a better opportunity of liquidation, the court may order such business continued."
(Emphasis added.) It may be questioned whether or not this is a
form of investment, and as such not allowed by the statutory
provision limiting legal investments. 4 I doubt if the Supreme
Court would so hold, and I think the fiduciary would be protected
by a court order that allowed him to continue the business under
the previously mentioned statute. A practical approach which
recognizes the type of business and other problems involved is
preferable to a strictly legalistic viewpoint. We have a moral as
well as a legal duty in all of these matters, and sometimes our moral
duty may outweigh our legal duty in determining such questions
as whether or not it is wise to continue a business or appoint a
special administrator.
DISTRIBUTION PRIOR TO FINAL SETTLEMENT

Another important, practical matter frequently arising during the administration of an estate is partial distribution in advance of final settlement. The widow's allowance is in the nature
of such a distribution, though not always thought of in these
21d., at § 113.
'Id., at § 148.
4Id., at § 126(4).
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terms. The covering statute provides that upon the application
of a widow, she shall be allowed the sum of $2,000 in cash or the
equivalent thereof in real or personal property as her sole and
separate property.5 If there are minor children of the decedent
who are stepchildren of the widow, then her allowance will be
limited to $1,000, and the legal guardian or next of kin appointed
by the court for such children may receive the balance. I think
it is well to bear in mind that the full allowance is available to
children of the decedent where there is no surviving widow. As
fourth class claims, these allowances take precedence over the
fifth class claims of creditors, and therefore are of particular value
to surviving widows and children.
The allowances are granted upon application of the widow,
her personal representative or representatives of the children. It
should be noted that the widow is entitled to her allowance independent of her distributive share and regardless of any election
she may have made to take her statutory share of one-half the
estate.6 The cases hold, however, that to claim
the allowance the
7
widow or child must be resident in the state.
In addition to the widow's allowance, an ordinary distributive share may be obtained prior to final settlement. The court
may even approve a partial distribution which the executor or
administrator may make prior to the six months period for filing
claims. If, however, it is subsequently discovered that there are
insufficient funds to pay the claims, the representative may find
himself in a delicate position, since it is likely that the distributees
have expended their shares. Certainly, it is our duty to advise
the fiduciary of this possibility.
After the six months period for filing claims has past and
you can present evidence of sufficient funds to pay all claims, not
overlooking the possibility of additional inheritance taxes, you
will find that the court will be receptive to any reasonable suggestion or recommendation regarding distribution. Other factors
permitting, the rules of court allow a distribution of ten per cent
without bond. The court may require a refunding bond from the
distributee if the distribution is made prior to the expiration of
the time for filing claims. You will find, too, that the court will
be more lenient in approving distribution prior to the six months
period if the fiduciary is under a surety bond.
SALES OF PERSONALTY AND REAL ESTATE

The sale. of personal property is governed by statute which
permits the fiduciary to retain in an estate almost any personalty
which he desires. 8 As a practical matter, I think it may be de5
6

1d.. at § 211.
Id., at § 31. Hodgkins v. Ashby, 56 Colo. 553, 139 Pac. 538 (1914).
'Lions v. Egan, 107 Colo. 32, 108 P. 2d 873 (1940); Wiginton v.
Colo. 78, 145 P. 2d 980 (1944).
8 Id., at § 147.

Wiginton, 111
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sirable to have all of the personal property appraised in the interest of avoiding arguments with the Inheritance Tax Commissioner
and the assessor's office regarding values. If you desire to sell
any of the personal property, it must be by order of court unless
the will contains such a power. Procuring a court order for the
general sale of all personalty at not less than the appraised price
and with the manner of sale designated, i.e. public or private,
will usually dispose of the matter.
The procedure for the sale of real estate is also purely statutory.9 Attorneys who do not handle these matters every day should
check the statutes carefully before initiating the procedure, although there are forms available for all of the steps. Of course,
if the will contains a broad power of sale for real estate, the statutory procedure is unnecessary, but, if there is no such power, or
if an intestate estate is involved, the following steps should be
taken:
1. Appraisal of property.
2. Petition to sell.
3. Notice of sale.
a. Service of such notice.
b. Petition and order of publication, if necessary.
4. Order for sale.
5. Report of sale.
6. Order confirming sale.
At the time of securing this last order, you should have your
fiduciary's deed certified by the court. Since the fiduciary's deed
contains his name and capacity, it is not necessary to record a
copy of the letters of appointment. 10 Where a person has entered
into a written contract for the conveyance of real estate but dies
before executing it, his fiduciary may be required to perform the
contract."
TRANSFER OF CORPORATE SECURITIES

Through the efforts of T. Raber Taylor, of the Denver bar,
we now have available a very comprehensive petition and order
for the sale of securities which have greatly facilitated their transfer by eliminating the necessity for furnishing letters with each
sale. If a will provides the power to sell securities, court procedure is unnecessary, but certified copies of the will must be
furnished with each stock transfer. Upon request, some companies
will return the copy of the will which may be used again to save
some cost to the estate.
If there is no power of sale given in the will and the stock
is not quoted on the "big board," it is necessary to have the secur9Id., at §§ 155 through 193.
"oReal Estate Title Standard No. 38 of the Denver and Colorado bar associations.
"COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 176, §§ 116-121 (1935).
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ities appraised. Thereafter, an order of the court authorizing
the sale is all that is necessary. No notice is necessary. Armed
with certified copies of the order and inheritance tax releases,
I suggest you approach your stock broker for further advice and
guidance. Each company has different requirements. Some demand affidavits of non-residency, some require local inheritance
tax releases, and still others ask for untold and unknown items
prior to completing the actual transfer.
FEES OF FIDUCIARIES AND ATTORNEYS

The fiduciary does not have to accept any fee, and in family
or small estates often does not take the full maximum allowed
him under statute. 12 In an estate where there is a conservator,
there is a little joker in the statute which provides that when the
estate of any person under legal disability shall require administration for more than one year, the county court may order
additional compensation to the personal representative.' 3 This
may be of help in obtaining a larger fee for your client. It might
be mentioned that these maximum fees were set in 1908, and if
it is felt that they are too low, the matter must be taken up with
the legislature and not with the court.
The minimum fee schedule adopted by the Denver Bar Association on January 3, 1949 recommends as attorney fees in an
estate matter four per cent of the gross assets up to $100,000,
with a minimum fee of $100. The schedule adopted by 'the Colorado Bar Association convention of October, 1948, was even more
sanguine, recommending a figure of six per cent of the gross
assets.
Apparently the Denver County Court has never been aware
of these recommended minimums, or if it has, it does not approve,
for I have found that the usual fee allowed will run from three to
three and one-half per cent of the gross estate. If it is desired to
charge over and above that amount, it would be advisable to have
all the heirs approve the fee in writing or to discuss the work
with the court. Certainly there are many cases where unusual
services have been rendered. Under such circumstances, I feel
sure that the court will lend a sympathetic ear.
OTERO-CROWLEY BAR ELECTS STRAIN
George L. Strain of La Junta is the new
Otero-Crowley County Bar Association. Other
for the new bar association year are Robert A.
way, vice-president, and John R. Stewart of La
treasurer.
"Id., at § 232.
"Id., at § 89(5).

president of the
officers selected
Trainor of OrdJunta, secretary-
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXATION
BY ALBERT J. GOULD AND KENNETH L. SMITH
of the Denver Bar

A LITTLE FRAUD, A LOT OF GRIEF
A taxpayer made substantial deductions for traveling and
living expenses which were plainly improper and the fraud penalty
was applied to the entire deficiency although the part of the deficiency due to the fraudulent deductions was relatively small.
Imeson, 14 T. C. No. 130.
PARTNERSHIP CONTINUITY

Every partnership agreement should contain a provision providing either that the partnership shall continue in the event of
the death of a partner or that it may continue at the election of
the surviving partners. With such provisions permitting a continuation of the partnership, the share of a deceased partner's income for the fiscal year in which death occurs will be determined
at the end of the fiscal year and not at the date of death.
"Congress sought to cause income from partnership business
to be reflected in individual returns according to a fair and convenient plan geared to the normal mechanics and accounting practices of partnership business. ..

"

Girard Trust Co. et al., Execs., v.

U. S. (C. A. 3rd)
The reason for the above is emphasized in the case of a partnership which had a fiscal year ending January 31 and a partner
died December 5. If the above rule did not apply, his individual
return would include his share of the income for the previous
year ending January 31 and his share of the income at the date
of death which would group almost two years' income in one
calendar year. But if the partnership continued under either of
the suggested provisions, no income would be taxable to the partnership for the share of the year immediately prior to death until
the end of the succeeding fiscal year.
Is NOT EVIDENCE
In A & A Tool & Supply Co., (C. A. 10th), the Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court although the evidence was far from
satisfactory because the Tax Court "may not arbitrarily discredit
and disregard unimpeached, competent and relative testimony of
a taxpayer which is uncontradicted."
COMMISSIONER'S PRESUMPTION
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In this case the witness owned the property and testified that
the reasonable rental value was $3,000 per year. The court held
that since there was no evidence to the contrary, and since the
presumption in favor of the Commissioner's findings is one of
law only and is not evidence, there was nothing to support the
Tax Court finding that the reasoriable rental value was $600 instead of $3,000, as testified by the only witness. The foregoing
rule is of utmost importance to all trial practitioners before the
Tax Court.

THE INVENTORY AND FINAL REPORT
JOHN L. GRIFFITH
of -the Denver Bar and Clerk of the Denver County Court

The intent of this discussion is to cover the most overlooked
details in the preparation of the inventory and closing an estate.
Grace Whitcomb, Inventory Auditor and Bookkeeper, Denver
County Court, states that the inventory is the most important
document filed in the county court.
The inventory is the basic document: for determining sufficiency of the bond, whether property is being or has been administered upon; for determining the sufficiency of orders for sale
or disposition of assets; for auditing fiduciary accounts, intermediate and final reports; for clearance with the Inheritance Tax
Department upon closing; to bar creditors;' and for fixing docket
fees.2 Unless all property is inventoried, it will be necessary to
reopen the estate, inventory or correct the original inventory to
include the omitted property, obtain clearance from the Inheritance Tax Department, and then reclose the estate.
All property administered upon and distributable through
the Colorado county court, including the property received from
ancillary administration elsewhere, should be inventoried. Property which is not part of the estate and which is not to be administered upon through the Colorado county court, as well as property held in joint tenancy and life insurance policies payable to
a specific beneficiary (not the personal representative or estate),
should not be inventoried.
Values reported should be those at date of death of decedent
and at the date of appointment of a guardian or conservator.
Income accumulated to date of death of decedent and to date of
appointment of a guardian or conservator should be dealt with
as corpus. If property was being purchased under contract, the
gross value of the property should be stated with the balance due
being treated as an encumbrance. In reporting an interest in a
partnership, the trial balance, net worth statements, or account' COLO.

STAT. ANN., C. 176, § 207

"COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 66, § 23 (1)

(1935).

(1935).
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ant's report should be attached to explain the valuation given to
the partnership interest.
A court appraisement is generally necessary to determine the
value of a life estate in real and personal property; the mortality
tables will establish the value of specific cash payments for life.
A valuation should not be stated for veteran's benefits and benefits which may be terminated at the will of the grantor. In such
cases, the docket fee will be fixed upon the amount received.
If additional assets are discovered, they may be reported in
a supplemental inventory describing the newly discovered assets,
writing in the other schedule "no change," or by filing an amended
inventory reporting the total assets to date. The additional docket
fee, except the docket fee for sale or mortgage of real estate, is
payable at the time of filing the inventory.
If the status of the fiduciary changes as from special administrator to executor or from conservator or guardian to special
administrator, administrator, or executor, then a new inventory
should be filed. If the second appointment is made before the inventory is filed for the first appointment, a joint inventory may
be submitted. For example: Joe Doe as special administrator and
executor of the estate of Richard Roe, deceased.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE INVENTORY

The instructions approved by Judge C. Edgar Kettering of
the Denver County Court are the most concise directions as to
the proper way of preparing an inventory form with which I am
acquainted. Since these instructions are the same ones that are
applicable for use on the standard inventory form approved by
the Colorado Bar Association's Committee on the Standardization
of County Court Forms, 3 and since they are no longer printed
on the inventory form itself, they are reproduced here for the
guidance of interested attorneys.
The inventory must be completed and filed within one month from the date
letters of appointment are issued. Whenever any property shall come to the
possession or knowledge of the representative which was not included in the
inventory first filed, a supplemental inventory must be filed showing such additional property.
If the heirs or legatees of an intestate or testator are unknown, or if known
and there is no person qualified to receive the distributive shares of such heirs
or legatees, the administrator or executor filing this inventory shall serve the
Attorney General with one copy in person or by registered mail. (See Ch. 176,
Secs. 145 and 146.)
If space provided under any schedule is insufficient, additional sheets with
appropriate schedule headings should be attached. If the estate owns no property specified under any schedule, the word "None" should be inserted in that
schedule.
3 John L. Griffith, chairman; County Judge William T. Eckhart; B. C. Hilliard, Jr.;
Robert H. LaGrange; William A. Mason; William F. Robinson, Jr.; Hon. C. M. Somerville; County Judge Christian D. Stoner; Benjamin A. Woodcock.
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SCHEDULE A-REAL ESTATE. List each parcel separately, giving legal
description, type of property, as, for example, dwelling house or store building,
street address, if any, and state title by which held. Enter the estimated gross
value of each parcel in the column headed "Value," and total encumbrances, if
any, against each parcel in the column headed "Encumbrances." Examples:
Encumbrances
Value
Lots 1 and 2, Block 1, Doe's Addition, Denver,
being a dwelling house commonly known as
$2,500.00
$ 5,000.00
1234 Doe St. Title in fee........................................
An undivided one-half interest in Lots 24 and 25,
Block 2, Doe's Addition, Denver, being a business block known as the Doe Building, and
numbered 2400 Doe St. Title in fee subject
None
10,000.00
to a lease expiring January 1, 1960 ----------------

SCHEDULE0 B - CASH AND BANK ACCOUNTS. State amount of cash
on hand. List each bank account separately, giving names and addresses of
banks, and state whether checking or savings accounts. If savings account
give number thereof and interest rate. Enter amount of cash on hand and
amount of each bank account in column headed "Amount." Examples:
Amount
$150.00
Cash on hand ..................................................................
222.50
..................................
Checking account, Tenth National Bank, Denver----Savings account No. 1234, First State Bank, Denver;
558.00
interest rate 2% ...........................................................

SCHEDULE C - BONDS. In first column give the face value, by whom
issued, kind of bond (for example, refunding, special improvement, or sinking
fund), interest rate, type of security (for example, bond, first mortgage or
debenture), date issued, date due, optional due date, if any, and what coupons,
if any, are attached. In second column state whether good, doubtful or desperate, and in third column enter estimated value. List alphabetically.
Examples:
$1,000.00 Middletown, Colorado, Improvement
District No. 1, 5% bonds, issued 6/15/37,
due 6/15/57, optional 6/15/55, with
6/15/49 and subsequent coupons at$1,040.00
Good
tached .............................................................
2,000.00 The Roe Corporation sinking fund 7%
debentures, issued 1/1/39, due 1/1/59,
with 7/1/43 and subsequent coupons
250.00
Doubtful
attached ---------------------------------------------------------NOTES AND ACCOUNTS. Notes, accounts, contracts
SCHEDULE D and all other evidences of indebtedness except bonds and bank accounts should
be listed in this schedule. As to notes, state in first column the amount of
unpaid principal, name of maker, date made, date due, interest rate and when
payable, and date to which interest has been paid, followed by brief description
of security (if unsecured, so state). As to accounts, state in first column the
amount, type of account, name of debtor, when incurred (in case of running
accounts this is the date of the last item) and the date due. As to all items in
this schedule state in the second column whether good, doubtful or desperate,
and enter the estimated value in the third column. List items alphabetically.
Examples:
$2,000.00 Note of John Doe, made June 1, 1949,
due June 1, 1954, 6% interest payable
quarterly, interest paid to June 1, 1950,
secured by first trust deed on 4321 Doe
$2,000.00
Good
St., Denver ------------------------------------------------------

DICTA
150.00
100.00

book account of Sarah Due incurred
June 11, 1948, due July 1, 1948 .............
note of Richard Roe, made June 1,
1945, due June 1, 1946, 8% interest
payable at maturity; no interest paid;
unsecured ........................................................
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Doubtful

Desperate

100.00

0.00

SCHEDULE E - CORPORATE STOCKS. Give number of shares, per
value, class of stock (common or preferred), name of corporation, and where
incorporated. If company has more than one kind of stock of the class described
give data sufficient to identify it. Enter estimated value of shares in column
headed "Value." List alphabetically. Examples:
100 shares of $100 par value common stock of American Telegraph company, a Colorado corporation ........................................ $17,800.00
10 shares of no par value cumulative 7% first preferred stock
of Foreign Power Company, a Colorado corporation ...................
950.00
5 shares of no par value cumulative $6 dividend series preferred stock of Foreign Power Company, a Colorado corporation ..................................................................................................
480.00
SCHEDULE F-ALL OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY. Under this schedule list all personal property other than that described under Schedules B, C,
D and E, stating, as required by Ch. 176, Sec. 145, 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, the kind, number, amount and value of the several articles. Enter the
estimated value of each item in the column headed "Value."
FINAL REPORT AND CLOSING

"The Final Report is the most important document filed in
the county court," states Dolores M. Rowley, Chief Auditor of
the Closing Department, Denver County Court, with great originality.
Before preparing the final report, it is advisable to examine
the court file, probate fee book and claim register in the Clerk's
office to determine whether all statutory publications have been
made, to determine whether any claims or assignments of interest have been filed without notification to the attorney for the
estate, and to determine whether all docket fees and fees for sale
or mortgage of real estate, guardian ad litem fees, appraiser's
fees, dedimus expense, publication costs, and costs of adjudication in cases of mental incompetent, have been paid. It should also
be ascertained whether the report of the Inheritance Tax Commissioner or certificate of waiver of inheritance tax has been filed
and whether service is complete in determination of heirship proceedings. If the value placed by the Inheritance Tax Department
is greater than that reported in the inventory, an additional docket
fee may be payable. The foregoing information may be obtained
by telephoning the Clerk's office.
From the experience of the Closing Department of the Denver County Court, the following items are those most likely to be
overlooked in closing an estate, in the order stated:
1. Inheritance tax, plus 10% for old age pension should be
deducted from the individual shares of heirs or legatees unless
otherwise provided for in the will.
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2. Payments from estate funds should be supported
by claims
4
filed within the six month period for items over $25.
3. Subsequently discovered assets should be inventoried and
reported to the Inheritance Tax Department prior to closing the
estate.
4. All claims, whether paid or not, should be allowed or disallowed by the fiduciary, and notice should be sent by registered
mail by the Clerk (upon your request) at least ten days before
final settlement to claimants whose claims have not theretofore
been allowed or disallowed by the court s Even though the estate
is declared insolvent and the claims cannot be paid in full, they
should be allowed or disallowed by the fiduciary, and the distribution pro rated in accordance with the statutory priorities.
5. Approval by distributees, or by a court order, should be
obtained when items of personalty are distributed in lieu of cash.
Such distribution should be based upon court appraisal unless
personalty is a listed security which may be distributed based on
the market value.
6. Successor fiduciaries should approve the final report of
the former fiduciary.
7. Personal service should be made on all heirs and guardians
residing in Colorado for hearing on determination of heirship.,
8. When partial distribution has been made during administration to arrive at the amount finally distributable, the partial
distribution should be added into the balance on hand shown on
the final report before distributive shares are computed, then
deducted from the individual's share, rather than using the figure
on hand for distribution and then deducting the advance.
9. A certified copy of letters of appointment of personal representative should be furnished (unless appointment is in probating court) when distribution is being made to the estate of
an heir or legatee who dies during process of administration, or
to person under legal disability.
10. Application for widow's allowance must be filed within
six months from the date letters are issued. 7 An election of the
surviving spouse must be filed within six months from the date
that the will is admitted to probate.
11. A check should be made to make certain that the five
dollar fee on petition to sell real estate and the $2.50 fee per thousand on the sale is paid before making up final report.
12. Only after a ward reaches his majority or a mental incompetent is restored to reason may he be served with notice of
final settlement four weeks hence and a report of accounts and
actions of the guardian or conservator.
4

COLO. STAT. ANN.,
Id., at § 228.
Id., at § 19.

Id., at § 207.

C. 176, § 201 (1935).

Sce also § 207A.
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13. The maximum fiduciary fee is set by statute. A fee of
three per cent is allowable on -sale, mortgage, or rentals from real
estate.8 This is a maximum fee, not a flat "statutory fee."
14. Distributees who are minors or mental incompetents must
have representatives appointed before an order of distribution
can be made by the court. If the distribution is for $500 or less,
and order of transfer may be used under the Small Estates Act. 9
15. A decree of heirship is not necessary in estates declared
insolvent. Publication of notice of final settlement must be made
if the fiduciary is to be discharged.
16. A sufficient bond must be furnished to cover cash, personalty, and gross rents for a year. A personal bond will be accepted if the will dispenses with a bond or if the above described
assets are $500 or less. This is a statutory requirement. 10
17. Appraisals must be completed and filed within one month
from the date of issuance of the warrant."'
18. Court orders should be secured for expenditures other
than costs of administration in the absence of claims or power
under will.
19. If in any case of a testamentary trust it shall appear to
the county court that it was not the intention of the testator that
the court should continue the administration of the estate after
the payment in full of all debts and legacies except the trust fund
or property, such court may proceed to final settlement of such
estate as in other cases and order the2 trust fund or property to
be turned over to the trustee as such.'
In closing insolvent estates, the safer practice is to petition
the court to set the matter down for hearing upon the priorities
of claimants and amount of distribution to them. The court should
then be asked to determine the manner of service of the notice
of such hearing to be given each claimant and parties in interest.
The petition should set forth the priorities as seen by the attorney
for the guidance of the court.
It is always well to remember that an objection to any expenditure of a fiduciary may be made at any time prior to the
approval of the final report and that an expenditure approved in
any intermediate report may again be reviewed by the court upon
presentation of the final report.
It is the practice of the Denver County Court to authorize
distribution to the testamentary trustee, accept the receipt from
the trustee, and discharge the fiduciary if the will provides that
the trust is not to be under the jurisdiction of the county court.
In the absence of such provision, or upon a showing that it was
5Id., at § 232.
OId., at § 77.
'lId., at § 95.

31Id., at § 237.
12Id., at § 227(c).
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not the intention of the testator that the court should continue
the administration of the estate, the appointment of a testamentary
trustee should be made before distribution to him.
Since the writer has to continue amicable relations with both
Miss Whitcomb and Mrs. Rowley, he has attempted to maintain
a neutral position as to which is the most important-the inventory or the final report. Both documents are very important, and
if carefully prepared will save many hours of. time.

CONTINUING A BUSINESS AFTER OWNER'S
DEATH BY MEANS OF LIFE INSURANCE
HARRY S. BERNSTEIN*

Man finds the thought of dying rather unpleasant, but the
man of wealth must find it most repelling. Not only is he barred
from Heaven (for he is assured that his entrance will be made
with the ease and grace of a camel passing through the eye of a
needle), but he is also confronted with the prospect of separating
himself from possessions which have given his life so much significance and comfort before he can set forth on his unhappy
journey.
Unfortunately the state of the law has not progressed to such
an extent that it can give counsel which will aid man in a better
world. It will, therefore, be necessary to limit this discussion to
comments on how life insurance can be used to aid the man of
property in the divestiture of his possessions to the maximum
benefits of his survivors and to his own greatest satisfaction.
The business of life insurance has moved farther and more
quickly than the law which supports it. The life insurance superstructure is a much more complex and integrated construction
than is the legal foundation which supports it, and when examples
of insurance contracts are introduced which seem to rest on little
or no legal foundation, it is because no decisions are available on
which to test these innovations, as statutory law has not yet
caught up with this phase of the insurance business.
Business insurance is an extremely useful tool in estate planning. The man who has the greatest portion of his wealth invested
in a business faces a much more serious problem in estate planning
than does a man who has his wealth in real estate, stocks or bonds.
In order to insure that the full value of his estate is realized,
a business man must insure that his business interests will not
be liquidated immediately after his death. He must arrange for
the continuance of his business, for if he does not the forced
liquidation of his business may result in a depletion of his estate
* Student, University of Denver college of Law.
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with the resultant hardship on his dependents. Even planned and
careful liquidation will seldom yield the full value of the decedent's
interest.
PROBLEMS OF THE SOLE PROPRIETOR AND PARTNERSHIP

The sole proprietor must find someone to whom he can entrust
his business, and when he finds the person he can trust he should
insure his plans by entering into a binding agreement with him
for the sale of the enterprise as a going concern to be carried out
on the proprietor's death. Usually this person will be a trusted
employee who would wish to insure his livelihood by purchasing
the business.
Death of a partner in the case of a partnership either forces
liquidation of the business or its complete reorganization by admitting the heirs of the deceased--or a purchaser of their interest-as partners. The surviving partners may buy out the interest
of the heirs, or the surviving partners may sell out to the heirs.
None of these alternatives is satisfactory. As in the case of
the sole proprietorship, forced liquidation results in the sacrifice
of assets, reducing the value of the decedent's estate and bringing hardship to the decedent's heirs.
If the surviving partner proceeds according to law, he will
liquidate the partnership's business by selling the partnership
property for what it will bring, pay its debts, and divide the remainder, if any, with the estate of his deceased partner. In the
process he loses a substantial part of his investment, liquidates
himself out of a job, and with it, all his plans for his future.
Starting his business career all over again may be impossible, and
so he may welcome almost any plan that promises to save his
business life; but to do so by coming to an agreement with the
heirs of the deceased may be impossible.
Since the surviving partner is in the position of trustee as
to the estate of the deceased I and must make a fair and complete
disclosure of all facts present or prospective affecting the assets
of the estate, 2 he must, therefore, exercise great care in reaching
any agreement for continuing the business with the heirs of the
deceased. If he is not circumspect, he is in danger of having the
costly experience of paying out of his own pocket the share which
would have belonged to the decedent's estate had the partnership
3
been liquidated at the decedent's death.
In trying to form a new partnership with the heirs, the surviving partner will discover that the heirs cannot join in a partnership with respect to partnership assets until they have received
such property from the administrator. Furthermore, there is no
I Joseph v. Herzig, 198 N. Y. 456, 92 N.E. 103 (1910).
'Anderson

v. Droge, 216 Iowa 159, 248 N.W.

344 (1933).

3 In re Ducker's Estate, 263 N.Y.S. 217 (1933).
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way to compel either the surviving partner or the heirs to form
a new partnership. Should either prove unwilling, the liquidation
of the partnership must proceed. The surviving partner will be
forced to carry the whole load of management, unless the heirs
have been active in the business. If the partnership is formed
with the widow, there is a divergence of economic interest. The
surviving partner will likely be interested in building up the business and plowing back the profits, while the widow may be interested only in the amount of income she can derive from the business. The result can be dissension and eventual dissolution of
the partnership.
Should the surviving partner wish to sell his interest to the
heirs, he will need the consent of the executor or administrator
of the estate and all of the heirs in order to be relieved of his legal
duty to liquidate the partnership. Minor heirs cannot give such
consent, and the legal representative may find it impossible to
concur because of creditors' objections. Here again, the surviving partner may be selling himself out of a job and a career, and
the heirs will be taking over a business about which they may
know little.
On the other hand, should the heirs decide to sell to the surviving partner, they again confront him with the legal difficulties
of his fiduciary capacity. Should any of the heirs ever be dissatisfied with the transaction, the surviving partner will have
the burden of proving that the purchase of the partnership assets
did not violate his position of trustee.4 Not only does the surviving
partner face the danger of trusteeship laws, but also the executor
or: administrator may insist on liquidation, or the heirs may refuse
to sell. If the heirs and executor or administrator consent, then
the creditors may insist on cash or refuse to permit the transfer
of the partnership assets.
The surviving partner may not have sufficient cash to acquire
the decedent's interest. He may find borrowing difficult, creditors
insistent, and the heirs uncompromising. He may decide that
the task of acquiring the interest in the partnership for himself
is so onerous as to make it seem the lesser evil to suffer the losses
of liquidation than to attempt to purchase the assets of the partnership.
PROBLEMS OF THE CLOSED CORPORATION

The death of a stockholder in a closed corporation creates problems similar to those discussed above in the case of a sole, proprietor and a partnership.
Since a closed corporation practically operates as a partnership, some of the same problems confronting a partnership which
Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, 126 Conn. 633, 7 A. 2d 915 (1935).
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has lost a partner face the closed corporation when a stockholder
dies. The surviving stockholders, if theirs are minority holdings,
are faced with the possibility of loss of their jobs and of being
removed from control of the corporation. Most closed corporations
began as partnerships and, in order to limit liability, thereafter
incorporated. The same informal relationship of the partners is
carried forward into the corporation. The partners may not have
had equal capital investments, but the services of one partner
may have offset his lesser capital contribution. In this informal
atmosphere, which is the basis of most small businesses, the problems were met and solved. With the death of a stockholder, this
informal relationship is disturbed. The administrator or executor
and heirs approach the business appraisingly. Their prime concern is their own interests, and the interests of the business come
later. They may insist on active participation without having
the necessary experience. They may demand excessive salaries
which the firm cannot afford.
As was pointed out above, if the administrator or executor
or the heirs represent majority stockholdings, and their interests
seem to them to require the elimination of the minority stockholders, who have formerly been active in the direction of the
company, the minority stockholders will have little choice but
to yield. With no survivorship agreement, they are powerless
to oppose the actions of those who now hold the majority stock.
Even though the majority stockholders may wish to dispose of
their holdings and turn over the business to the minority stockholders, there may be financial problems. The minority stockholders may find that they can't buy the stock for the price which
the executor, administrator, or heirs may require. Ordinarily
all their funds are tied up in the business, and the outlook of
coming to an equitable agreement with the majority stockholders
for the price of the stock is never favorable.
If the decedent's estate owns only a minority interest, then
the estate may be left without income. The decedent's dependents will fail to realize that the earnings of the decedent were
not due primarily to his stock holdings, but rather to his services.
With his death, his services must necessarily be replaced, and the
salary which he received stops. The minority stockholders may
bring action to force the payment of greater dividends, but this
is seldom successful in case of a properly managed business. At
directors' meetings the minority stockholders may obtain representation and there try to change their position, but these acts
are bound to fail if the majority oppose them.
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT FUNDED BY LIFE INSURANCE

The problems confronting the individual who wishes to make
the best provision for his dependents and whose wealth is invested
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in a business have been examined in detail to emphasize their
difficulty and complexity. It is well to bear in mind that these
problems can be avoided. They occur only when no plan has been
formulated prior to the death of the owner of the interest in the
business. The usual method of providing for the continuance of
the business after death is by means of a purchase and sale agreement. These are of various types, but only the purchase and sale
agreement funded by life insurance will be considered here.
For a sole proprietor such an agreement must stipulate the
purchase price or a definite valuation formula, and most important, it must assure that the purchaser will have sufficient money
to buy the business when proprietor dies. This can be done by
funding the purchase sale agreement. 5
Funding an agreement is accomplished by means of life insurance. The employee takes out a life insurance policy on the
life of the employer equal to the amount agreed upon in the purchase
sale agreement." The prospective purchaser owns the policy, pays the
premiums, and will receive the proceeds of the insurance on the
seller's life. Since the ownership of the insurance and all rights
with respect thereto are in the purchaser, the estate of the decedent will not be taxed for the insurance proceeds, because he
holds no incidents of ownership and has paid no premiums on
his insurance contracts. His estate will be taxed only for the
business interest.
With a purchase and sale agreement entered into fairly, the
proprietor gains the advantage of having his business continued
after his death and of knowing that it will be disposed of at its
full cash value. He also knows the amount of his estate tax in
advance, and can plan for its payment. He is thus able to complete his estate plans, and leave his affairs in an orderly manner
and not subject his heirs to a process of forced liquidation resulting in losses, delays, and confusion.7
In the case of partnerships and corporations, the insured
purchase and sale agreement should contain the following provisions:
1. Each partner or stockholder must agree that he will not
sell his interest in the partnership or his stock in the corporation during his lifetime without first offering it for
sale to the other partners or stockholders at the agreed
price.
56 Laikin,
Death Taxes and Your Business, 86 Trusts and Estates 13 (1948).
Menard, Life Insurance and Federal Estate Tax, 27 N. Car., L. R. 43, 56 (1948).
The question of insurable interest should be carefully considered by the attorney in
anticipation of a possible contest with the insurance company. This question is not
discussed herein upon the assumption that insurance companies, eager to sell this type
of insurance, will not raise such a defense.
7It should be determined whether the insurance policies can be qualified for the
Marital Deduction. See Reg. 105, Sec. 81.47a (b) (2) ; See. 81.47a (d) ; 62 Harvard
Law Review 497 (1949) ; Trachtman, Estate Planning 94.
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2. Each partner or stockholder on behalf of himself, his heirs,
and representatives, should agree to sell and each buyer
to buy the partnership interest or the shares of stock of
the decedent. This should be a definite commitment to
buy or sell, not a mere option.
3. The agreement shod state a definite commitment as to
the purchase price to be paid by the surviving partners
or stockholders for the deceased's interest or stock. This
may consist of a fixed amount or may be a valuation
formula.
4. The agreement should contain provisions for the purchase
of life insurance policies in agreed amounts with which
to finance the purchase. The agreement should state that
the rights in the policies shall be exercised only for the
purpose of carrying out the terms of the agreement.
5. The agreement should provide for the paying of any balance of the purchase price in excess of the insurance proceeds, as well as provisions for the disposition of funds
of insurance proceeds in excess of the purchase price.
6. The agreement should also contain a provision that the
deceased's estate will be held harmless from claims of
creditors of the business. 8
In addition to the above provisions there should be agreement
as to who should pay the life insurance premiums. In determining this the Legallett decision 9 should be kept in mind.
Under the plan outlined above, the surviving partners or
stockholders are the beneficiaries of the insurance; they will
receive the money which will enable them to purchase the deceased's interest. They are protected from control or interference
by outsiders; they maintain control of their business and acquire
ownership by the most convenient and economical plan.
Furthermore, since the survivors pay the premiums and are
the owners of the policy, the proceeds are not subject to estate
taxation. The proceeds will also be included in figuring the cost
basis of the partnership assets or of the stock acquired should
the survivors sell in the future.
To sum up, the following are the benefits of the purchase and
sale agreement funded by insurance: (1) The working capital
of the business is not disturbed. (2) Survivors are not forced
to take inexperienced people into the firm. (3) Survivors are
guaranteed the opportunity to buy the deceased's interest. (4)
The deceased's estate receives full payment in cash. (5) The deceased's family is not forced out without receiving full compensation for its interest. (6) The deceased's estate can be administered promptly.
8 Huebner,

The Beneficiary in Life Insurance, 178-9.
OLegallet v. Commissioner, 41 BTA 294 (1940).
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THE HIRSHORN CASE-AN EXTENSION OF
THE POWER OF EXECUTORS?
CARL V. LINDORFF*

A decision by the Colorado Supreme Court rendered July
11, 1949 presents an interesting problem in the drafting of wills
and their interpretation.'
The will of Hyman Hirshorn provided in part that his onehalf interest in the Algerian Club should go to ". . . all employees
who have been determined by my executor to be bona fide employees of the Algerian Club for more than one year prior to my
death." One, Georgetta Hendrickson, had been employed more or
less continuously for a period exceeding one year prior to the death
of the testator. Evidence was conflicting as to the nature and
causes of the interruptions in her employment. None of the employees had been employed continuously for one prior to the testator's death, due to a fire which necessitated closing the club for
a period. Georgetta Hendrickson was excluded by the executor
from participation in the will.
The Denver County Court made findings to the effect that
the petitioner, Hendrickson, was entitled to participate in the
will. The District Court of the City an4 County of Denver affirmed this judgment, saying in part:
In my judgment the petitioner, Georgetta Hendrickson, was a
bona fide employee of the Club Algerian. The evidence establishes,
I think, that she had worked there regularly for a period of not less
than one year prior to the death of Hyiman Hirshorn.

The Supreme Court of Colorado in a 4-3 decision reversed the
district court, holding that the will conferred upon the executor a discretionary power which should not be disturbed in the
absence of abuse of discretion. Speaking through Mr. Justice
Stone the court said: "Under such testamentary provision it
is the judgment of the executor and not the judgment of the
court which must prevail." In the minority opinion of Mr. Jus2
tice Holland, in which Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard concurred,
reference is made to this provision of the will, and it is said:
This lays bare an unequivocal direction and not discretion ....
This wording in the will before us contemplates that each and every
one who had regular employment for at least a year before the death
of the testator would share in his beneficence. Whenever any employee could establish such employment, his right to share could not
be denied, whether erroneously, arbitrarily, or capriciously.
* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
Hendrickson
v. Borga .......

Colo .......

209 P.

2d 543 (1949),

tion Advance Sheet for July 14, 1949 at page 21.
2 Mr. Justice Hays dissented upon other grounds.

Colorado Bar Associa-
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OTHER CASES RECOGNIZING EXECUTOR'S DISCRETIONARY POWER

The cases are numerous in which it has been held that where
the will confers discretionary powers upon the executor, the
exercise of such powers conferred will not be the subject of judicial review unless there has been an abuse of discretion. The case
of In re Barbey's Will 3 is of striking factual similarity. After
bequeathing the residue of the assets remaining after liquidation
of a certain corporation to the testator's employees, the will provided:
The proportional interest of each such employee shall be determined by multiplying the years of his or her service by total salary,
not including bonuses, received by him or her during the twentyfour months preceding my death. I authorize my executors to determine in their absolute discretion which employees will qualify to
receive a share under this paragraph and to interpret and apply in
their discretion the formula above stated. (Emphasis added).

Two employees whose employment had not been continuous from
day to day were excluded by the executor. The court upheld his
determination on the grounds that the executor was given discretionary power to make the determination, and in the absence of
abuse of discretion the court should not disturb his finding.
A Federal case 4 is in substantial accord with the preceding
case. The will provided in part, "the existing male executor shall
act as umpire, and his determination and decision over his signature attached to this will, shall in all respects be accepted as final."
In a suit by beneficiaries, the court in upholding the decision of
the executor, said:
Ordinarily a court will not disturb the findings of an arbitrator.
But if the arbitrator refuses to act, awards upon a matter not submitted, makes an incomplete determination or commits a gross mistake or error of judgment evincing partiality, corruption or prejudice,
transcends his authority or violates some statutory requirement on
which the dissatisfied party had a right to rely or commits some other
like error, courts of equity may interfere and correct the error.

In Wait Executors v. Huntington,5 the executor of the will
petitioned the court to have the terms of the will construed. The
court denied the request holding that the terms of the will conferred this power upon the executor by the following provision:
Should any informality appear or questions arise as to the meaning or legal construction of this instrument, I hereby direct that the
distribution of my estate shall be made to such persons and associations as my executors shall determine to be my intended legatees and
devisees and their construction of my will shall be binding upon all
parties interested. (Emphasis added).

The Supreme Court of Iowa reached a similar result in a suit
by a legatee against the executor. 6 The language in the will in
that case was: "If any question of construction or meaning shall
'32 N.Y.S. 2d 191 (1941).
4American Bd. of Commissioners of Foreign Missions v. Ferry, 15 Fed. 696
W.D. Mich., 1883).
'40 Conn. 9 (1873).
'Talladega College v. Callanan, 197 Iowa 556, 197 N. W. 635 (1924).

(C.C.
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arise under this will or any question of right or dispute shall arise
as to how much anyone is entitled to, I direct that the decision
of a majority of my said executors shall be final." (Emphasis
added.)
CASES WHEREIN DISCRETIONARY

POWER WAS DENIED

The courts, however, have not always exhibited such a reluctance to disturb the decisions of those to whom such discretionary
powers have been given. In the case of Taylor v. McClave,7 the
will provided:
I declare that if any question shall arise as to the construction
and administration of my will, or any clause, matter or thing therein
contained or with relation thereto, my trustees or trustee acting
either on their or his own judgment or under professional advice and
upon such evidence as they or he shall think fit may determine such
question by writing under their hands or hand; and I declare that
such determinationshall be final and binding on all persons interested

under this my last will or any codicil thereto.

(Emphasis added).

The will provided one-fifth of trust income to be divided
equally between William Parke McClave (testator's son) and Sara
F. McClave (his wife) and provided that the whole one-fifth
should go to surviving widow of deceased son so long as she remained unmarried. William P. and Sara F. McClave were divorced and she remarried. Subsequently, the trustees construed
the will to indicate that the intention of the testator was that the
one-half of the one-fifth of the income paid to Sara should cease.
The court reversed this determination upon the grounds that
neither of the two contingencies (first Sara predeceasing her
husband, or second, William's death and Sara's remarriage) upon
which her payments were to terminate had occurred. There was
no provision for the contingency that happened. The court further stated: "This court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction
by any direction of the testator to the effect that his executor or
any other person, other than the court shall construe or define
the provisions of a will."
A similar judicial view was displayed by the highest court
of Kansas 8 in referring to a provision in the will which gave the
executor authority to determine in writing, duly signed by him,
any question as to the construction and administration-of the will,
said, "It would not . . . be conclusive if the decision should have
been erroneous and a legatee would desire a review thereof in
the regularly constituted courts."
The rule most consistent with authority would seem to be
that where a discretionary power is clearly conferred and the limits of the power are defined, its exercise will not be reviewed by
the courts unless there is a showing of improper motives or bad
7128 N. J. Eq. 109, 15 A.

2d 213 (1940).

8Lydick v. Lydick, 147 Kan. 385, 76 P. 2d 876 (1938).
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faith. But the jurisdiction of the courts is not ousted by testamentary provision attempting to give the executor final and conclusive authority on all matters in the will.
THE HIRSHORN CASE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE RULE
The courts have been reluctant to disturb the decisions of executors vested with discretionary powers. How readily should courts
construe language in wills, the meaning of which is not clear, as
having conferred such power? The writer has encountered no
other case in which language comparable to that found in the
Hirshorn will has been held to give the executor such power.
The language in the Hirshorn will which relates to this particular is: "to all my employees who have been determined by
my executor to be bona fide employees." The majority opinion
places emphasis on the fact that the testator made the bequest
to the employees "who have been determined by my executor"
to be bona fide employees. Does this provision differ from a direction that the executor is to determine and pay the testator's
lawful debts? Certainly under such testamentary language it
would not be contended that the testator intended that his creditors' rights should be made to depend upon his executor's discretion.
A brief examination of the cases hereinbefore set forth, several of which were considered by the Colorado court, readily distinguishes the language in the wills considered from that in the
Hirshorn will.
In one case 9 the testator not only provided that the executor
was to determine, but went on to explain his intent by, "in their
absolute discretion" and "to interpret and apply in their discretion." Similarly, where the will provided that the executor should
act as umpire and that his determination should be in all respects
accepted as final,10 there is obviously an intention to grant to the
executor something beyond his usual authority. It would also
seem that where the powers granted are prefaced by such language as "should any informality appear or questions arise" 11 or
"if any question of construction or meaning shall arise," 12 it is
fairly evident that the testator's intention was to provide an extrajudicial means of settling controversial issues. Inasmuch as the
intent of the testator is to be ascertained from the four corners
of the will, such expressions should be considered since they
illuminate the words which follow.
The language employed in the Taylor case 13 and in Lydick
In re Barbey's Will, supra note 3.

10American Bd. of Commissioners of Foreign Missions v. Ferry, supra note 4.
11 Wait Executors v. Huntington, suvra note 5.

12Talladega College v. Callanan, supra note 6.
Is Supra note 7.
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v. Lydick 14 is equally unambiguous. The courts in these cases
simply denied the power of the testator to so hamper the judiciary.
It is inescapable that the decision in the Hirshorn case results in requiring less positive language that the testator intended
to grant discretionary powers to his executor than precedents
previously have required. It is noteworthy that nowhere in the
Hirshorn will were the duties of the executor likened to those of
an umpire, arbitrator,or a judge. Nowhere in the will is there
indication that determinations of the executor are to be final, discretionary, or binding.
The law of Colorado as represented by the Hirshorn case
makes it advisable to reexamine existing wills for words which
might be construed to grant the executor broader powers than
intended. In drafting wills in the future where the intention is
to create no powers of this nature, it would seem advisable to
avoid such language as: "I direct my executor to determine" or
"to such persons as my executor has determined." This can be
done by merely defining the objects of the testamentary disposition as: "to all employees who have been with the firm for not
less than one year immediately prior to my death." While the duty
to make the preliminary decision will thus devolve upon the same
person, the finality of the determination will be materially affected.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
B.S. IN PSYCHOLOGY
In reply to the article in the July, 1950, Dicta, by Robert B. Parks, I should
like to state that it must be apparent that if the losing of functional utility is
verbalized into normal activity channels, the socio-economic level will result In
a tendency to maladjustment. The net positive value of the environment interrelated with the socio-legal aspects of adjustmental pattern of the mores focalized on the social response considering sociability levels and status need, will
invariably result in the functional criteria "B". Deviate behavior, however,
considered together with chronicity behavior dynamics and considering also net
positive value of the environment in terms of maturation is obvious. Affectliaison without ego support must, of necessity, result in disfunctioning super-ego
(or lack of it). Distorted acquisition is held by some authorities to result in an
affect-distortion ratio in the societal group criterion "S". All of these factors
(or the lack of them) considering the interpersonal security of faulty developmental relationships in terms of frustration factors properly determinant in
a series of well-known studies will always result in a tendency toward the
ratio "BS".
Non-psychological Law-oriented reader,
FRANcIs L.
4 Supra

note 8.

SHALLENBERGER.
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FOR A RETURN TO FUNDAMENTALS!
July "Dicta" with its "Symposium on Juvenile Delinquency" is provocative
to people who are old-fashioned enough to believe that marriage and domestic
relations impose an honorable and decent social responsibility upon the individual concerned. In his contribution, Judge Gilliam judicially observes that
"no satisfactory substitute has ever been found to take the place of a good
home," . . .
Other contributors are ...,Robert B. Parks, Psychology Instructor, University of Denver, whose thesis attempts to resolve human delinquency by mathematical equations . . . All of them Including Judge Gilliam, carefully avoid
criticism or discussion of basic causes, such as our "Welfare State" or "Bootleg
Prostitution."
. * * * It should be self-evident that so long as we tolerate paternalistic
legislation and permit children to be raised as the wards of professional welfare
workers and "do-gooders," parental responsibility will decrease ... Social legislation is regimentation enforced by a police state. American women were not
built that way ....
To curb human apetities, "The Great Experiment" was designed to eradicate nature's fermentation of sugar into alcohol by legislation. Heedless of its
failure we are now and have been for many futile years attempting to curb
basic human reproductive instincts by outlawing the exercise of normal natural
processes. Result: the sexual pervert. Are we blind that we cannot see that
the same wave of crime, racketeering, blackmail and extortion which forced
the repeal of prohibition is now present in its most virulent form in the business of "Bootleg Prostitution"? It is as futile to legislate against the Instinct
of reproduction as it would be to pass laws against the pangs of hunger. Having
outlawed the prostitute, the sex offender, as we call him, lies in wait in every
street and alley. Our wives and children are his prey. * * *
Hollywood isn't helping the situation any either. * * * A rundown of fifty
of the Sunday film offerings in Denver disclo)ses 19 "Westerns and Adventures,"
9 "Features of the Eternal Triangle" and/or "Broken Homes," 7 "Musicales"
featuring "Cheese Cake" and scanties, 5 "Canned Burlesque" shows, 4 "Comedies," 1 "Mystery" show, 2 "Authentic Crime" pictures and last but not least,
3 legitimate "Dramas".
For sex education, Curtis Street on Monday offers a movie depicting "Women
Without Men and Beasts Without Mates"; another advertises "Uncaged," as a
"phenomenal inside picture that exposed for the first time the doped raging
emotions that beset the orient," and last but not least, a morb refined version
entitled "Shadow on the Wall" with the comment that "Some women will stop
at nothing!" All this education is offered from 12:00 noon until midnight to
all-comers, men, women and children. These pictures are as pornographic as the
censor will allow. They set an example for every moron in the community to put
into practice what he sees so graphically displayed. Let's stop it!
Our forefathers regarded licensed prostitution as an Institution affording
the only means by which sex orgies could be confined, controlled and policed.
The hardy pioneers of Fairplay regarded the profession as an honorable one
and bestowed the name "Silver Heels" upon the most beautiful peak in the
Mosquito Range. With Central City revivals now In the spotlight, perhaps this
is a good time to give the matter reasonable thought and see if a return to the
licensed and controlled area of the mining camps would not only vindicate the
wisdom of our forebears but be the means of controlling the plague of sex
offenders upon modern respectable society.
Any symposium that Ignores these social elements is useless. It simply
becomes a recital and catalogue of crimes and offenses without suggesting any
means that society can take for its own self preservation. * * *
GEOROE K. THOMAS.
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NEW MEMBERS OF THE COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION 1949-50
BOULDER COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
Donald G. Brotzman, Boulder
Frank A. Buchanan, Boulder
William E. Grelle, Boulder
Robert D. Inman, Boulder
John G. Mackie, Louisville

James G. Martin, Boulder
Henry L. McClintock, Boulder
Rupert M. Ryan, Boulder
John M. Sayre, Boulder
Charles E. Williams, Boulder

CONTINENTAL DIVIDE BAR ASSOCIATION
Lois G. Theobald, Breckenridge

DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
Willard L. Atkinson
E. A. Howard Baker, Jr.
Ernest S. Baker
Virginia E. Baker
William R. Bartlett
Bernard L, Beck
Silvio H. Bottone
Raymond D. Buckles
Louis W. Burford
James M. Burger
Philip G. Burney
Wallis L. Campbell
George A. Canjar
Edgar F. Conly
George L. Creamer
Dorothy M. Davis
Robert P. Davison
Tedford C. Dees
James J. Delaney
William T. Dingman
Joseph F. Dolan
Howard E. Erickson
James E. Fairchild, Jr.
Karl W. Farr, Jr.
Frederick M. Farrar
Wesley W. Forsyth
Willard H. Freeman
Bert A. Gallegos
Edward 0. Geer

Thomas A. Gilliam
Stanley Hagler
Alfred J. Hamburg
Robert C. Hawley
William H. Hazlitt
Milton G. Janecek
William D. Johnson
Philip C. Klingsmith, Jr.
John B. Kuhlman
Lila I. Ludlam
Andrew M. Lungren
Douglas J. Malone
James N. Matteson
Thomas E. McCarthy
George M. McNamara
Robert D. Means
Glenn F. Menhennett
Charles B. Messenger
Arch L. Metzner, Jr.
Anne L. Miller
Robert S. Mitchell
Robert B. Moch
H. Marguerite Morris
Marvin T. Mosko
Charles S. Motisher, Jr.
Herman A. Mundt, Jr.
Bruce Ownbey
James D. Parriott, Jr.
John B. Preston

John E. Radloff
H. Joe Rawlinson, Jr.
Warren E. Roberts
Melvin Rossman
Richard P. Ryan
Ralph Sargent, Jr.
Thomas K. Scallen
Roy S. Scott, Jr.
Edwin M. Sears
Robert C. Slyter
Norman B. Smith
Paul Snyder
Walter A. Steele
Ted P. Stockmar
Robert Sunshine
Fletcher Thomas
John B. Tweedy
George K. Voseipka
Lindsay P. Walden
Westel B. Wallace
Henry J. Walsmith
James L. Webb
Ford E. Weyandt
Walter B. Wilkinson
A. F. Winegardner, Jr.
Winston W. Wolvington
Jane C. Woodhouse
William R: Young

EL PASO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
C. J. Lewis, Colo. Springs
Austin Hoyt, Colo. Springs
N. C. Rosentreter, Colo. Springs
Louis Johnson, Colo. Springs
Frank A. Safranek, Limon

ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION
Donald F. Meyers, Salida
Allen W. Broadstreet, Salida
Thomas E. Fontecchio, Canon City Mack Witty, Fairplay
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION
John V. Condon, Aurora
Justin A. Gargan, Idaho Springs

Henry W. Luedde, Georgetown
George G. Priest, Lakewood

LARIMER COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
William C. Stover, Fort Collins

John J. Tobin, Fort Collins

MESA COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
James Dufford, Grand Junction
W. H. Hyde, Grand Junction
Tom E. Elder, Grand Junction
John W. Kennedy, Grand Junction
Harold R. Porter, Grand Junction

MIDWESTERN COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
Howard S. Bjelland, Montrose

William G. Waldeck, Montrose

NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION
Harry F. Claussen, Glenwood Springs

NORTHWESTERN COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
John B. Barnard, Jr., Granby

OTERO-CROWLEY BAR ASSOCIATION
John R. Stewart, La Junta

Robert A. Trainor, Ordway

PUEBLO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
William H. Adams, Pueblo
Albert G. Davis, Pueblo
Frank E. Evans, Pueblo
Gordon D. Hinds, Pueblo
John A. McCarthy, Pueblo

Robert L. McMichael, Pueblo
William E. Randall, Pueblo
Jack F. Seavy, Pueblo
Fred T. Tanquary, Pueblo
Edward M. Yaklich, Pueblo

SAN LUIS VALLEY BAR ASSOCIATION
Whitford Myers, Alamosa

SOUTHEASTERN COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
Edward C. Hastings, Eads
Harlan D. Johnson, Lamar

John J. Lefferdink, Eads
Carl M. Shinn, Lamar

SOUTHWESTERN COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
Charles E. Benson, Pagosa Springs

THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION
John E. Bell, Brush
Joseph Callahan, Wray
William Eichling, Sterling

William B. Paynter, Jr., Brush
Charles Sandhouse, Sterling
Ben D. Sublett, Sterling

WELD COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
Keith Miller, Greeley
R. Paul Brown, Fort Lupton
Richard S. Kitchen, Greeley
Ralph E. Rhoades, Jr., Greeley
E. A. McMillan, Greeley
Thomas A. Richardson, Greeley
James H. Shelton, Greeley
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THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
1950-1951
OFFICERS
President
Fritz A. Nagel .............................................
................................. First Vice-President
Dayton Denious .................................................
..................... Second Vice-President
Norma L. Comstock .......... ............................
Secretary-Treasurer
William B. M iller .................................................................................

TRUSTEES
To June 30, 1951
Douglas McHendrie
T. Raber Taylor

To June 30, 1952
Donald M. Lesher
William Rann Newcomb

To June 30, 1953
Ira L. Quiat
John H. Tippit

GOVERNORS
To June 30, 1951
Winston S. Howard
Jacob L. Sherman
Myles P. Tallmadge
Floyd F. Walpole
Fritz A. Nagel, ex-officio

To June 30, 1952
Charles J. Beise
Sydney H. Grossman
John L. J. Hart

COMMITTEES
AUDITING
Charles A. H askell ...............................................................................................
Robert C. Nihan
William IL Branch

Chairman

DICTA EDITORIAL BOARD
Philip A. Rouse

Frederick M. Farrar

ENTERTAINMENT
Chairman
R ichard H . Shaw .....................................................................................................
Edward A. Jersin
C. B. Hiester
Hamlet J. Barry, Jr.
J. Donovan Stapp
Peter H. Holme, Jr.
Louis I. Hart, Jr.
H. B. Valkenburgh
ETHICS AND GRIEVANCE
Joseph A. Craven ...................................................................................................... Chairinan
Harold Taft King
Albert S. Isbill
Theodore Epstein
Jacob L. Sherman
Samuel January
John E. Gorsuch
FELLOWSHIP
Floyd F. W alpole ......................................................................................................
William E. Hutton
Charles R. Enos

Chairmaon

INSTITUTE
Donald C. McKinlay ........................................
Ruth G. Lehman
Floyd Haskell
Thomas D. Smart

Chairman
William K. Ris

JUDICIARY
Chairman
George T. Evans ................................................................................................
Thomas D. Smart
Douglas McHendrie
Peter H. Holme, Jr.
Richard Tull
Allan R. Phipps
Louis G. Isaacson
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JUNIOR BAR
L. Berw yn Ullstrom ................................................................................................
Chairman
Hover T. Lentz
Wilbur M. Pryor
Frank H. Shafroth
Ted P. Stockmar
LEGAL AID
Harold D. Torgan ................................................................................... . ..........
Mary C. Griffith
William A. Sackmann Mary Seach
William E. Spangler

.Chairman

LEGAL SERVICE
Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr......... ..............................................
...................................
*
hairman
Milton J. Blake
Ralph E. Crandell
Mary C. Griffith
J. Colin James
LEGISLATIVE
Ira L . Q uiat ..............................................................................................................
Chairman
Hazel M. Costello
Lawrence M. Henry
Harry A. King
George L. Creamer
Donald M. Lesher
Royal C. Rubright
MEETINGS (Program)
R ichard M . Davis ......................................................................................................
Chairman
Pierpont Fuller, Jr.
William Grant
Charles Rosenbaum
T. Raber Taylor
Charles C. N icola ............................
John P. Akolt, Jr.
Mitchell Benedict

MEMBERSHIP
.................................
................................... Chairman
H. Harold Calkins
Walter A. Steele
Barkley L. Clanahan
H. Gayle Weller

MINIMUM FEES
H arry S. Silverstein, Jr.........................................................................................
Jacob H. Chisen
Darwin Coit
Ruth Hunt
Bart W. O'Hara

Chairman

PUBLIC RELATIONS
Sydney H. Grossman .............................................................................................. Chair-man
David Brofman
Victoria F. Gross
Donald M. Lesher
Edward C. Day
Paul M. Hupp
David Rosner
William E. Doyle
Louis G. Isaacson
L. Berwyn Ullstrom
Philip B. Gilliam
Charles- J. Kelly
REAL ESTATE STANDARDS
Edwin J. W ittelshofer ............................................................................................

Chairman

EXECUTIVE C03MITTEE

James B. Day
L. H. Drath
Golding Fairfield

Gilbert Goldstein
Albert S. Isbill
Donald M. Lesher

Percy S. Morris
Simon Quiat
Warren K. Robinson

GENERAL COMMITTEE

Sam Berman
Arthur Cassidy
Burton Crager
James D. Doyle
John L. Griffith

Charles H. Haines, Sr.
C. B. Hiester
Alex B. Holland
Merrill A. Knight
Harold E. Popham

Howard Roepnack
Mary Seach
Harold Webster
Alvin Weinberger

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
W illiam Rann N ewcom b ........................................................................................
Chairman
Saul Pinchick
William F. Robinson
Albert E. Zarlengo
Myles P. Tallmadge

